Evaluating the Success of the Crusades against Heretics.
Evaluating the Success of the
Crusades against Heretics.
by Quincy de Vries
Quincy de Vries is currently doing their MPhil in Medieval History at the University of Cambridge and have a B.A in History from McMaster University in Hamilton, Canada. I first fell in love with history watching YouTube videos about Anne Boleyn but didn’t actually decide to study it at University until I finished my first year in another program and realized history was what I loved to do. I hope to one day publish in either non-fiction or fiction to help make history accessible for all.
The crusades are deeply ingrained in cultural memory throughout the world and especially in the West. The depictions of crusades in popular culture typically paint crusades with one broad stroke; as violent movements against non-Christian groups in Outremer featuring epic rivalries such as that between Richard the Lionheart and Saladin. However, crusading was a Papal tool aimed not only at non-Christians; crusades against heretical Christian groups occurred on a massive scale. Due to the nature of heresy and the political landscape of Christendom in the crusading period, measuring the success of the crusades launched against heretics requires careful consideration. Any analysis must include an examination of a wide scope of political, societal and cultural factors. Considering the vast amount of scholarship and nuance behind each of the crusades against heretics, this article will use the Albigensian Crusade as a case study in order to make the scope of this analysis manageable. It is important to note that given the number of crusades launched against heretics, there would be little value in universally applying the findings of this article to all of them.
The aim of this analysis then is to examine the success of one crusade against heretics, the Albigensian Crusade. This paper will begin with (1) a brief overview of the historiography of the Albigensian Crusade, (2) lay out the criteria that will be used to measure its success, and finally, (3) apply these criteria to the crusade. This article argues that the Albigensian Crusade was successful because the crusaders achieved their original goal as defined at the outset of the crusade by the Pope, and because the outcome of the crusade was lasting and sustained. These criteria will be elaborated and analysed further.
To some academics, the Albigensian Crusade does not constitute a crusade at all. As laid out by Giles Constable in his historiographical overview of crusade history,1 traditionalists believe that to be a true crusade the aim must be to capture Jerusalem; a requirement that does not apply to the Albigensian crusade which took place in the Languedoc region of Southern France. However, the majority of crusade historians today are pluralists, who believe that a crusade must simply be a Papally sanctioned event, a criterion that the Albigensian Crusade does meet as it was launched by Pope Innocent III in 1209.2
The period of the Albigensian Crusade is one with a sparse narrative history, and there are few primary sources that deal directly with the crusade; a notable exception being the writings of Peter, a Cistercian monk and follower of the leaders of the crusade.3 Historian T.N Bisson attributes the lack of narrative history surrounding the Languedoc region and period of the Albigensian Crusade to the abundance of administrative writing from the region at the time, primarily secular charters, arguing that language and writing were seen as necessary administrative tools but not something to be enjoyed through narrative histories.4 There have also been various arguments that the lack of primary narrative sources is due to the language spoken in the South of France in the thirteenth century, Occitan, which did not have the same literary tradition of chansons and lais that is associated with the langue d’Oc used by the French Crown and in Northern France.5 Despite a dearth of primary sources, there are an abundance of secondary sources written concerning the Albigensian Crusade.
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, local narrative histories on the region and culture of Languedoc were being authored.6 It is inevitable that the authors of these works would have to deal with the traumatic event that was the Albigensian Crusade in recounting the region’s history, and often did so with both scholarly and political interests in mind. Guillaume de Catel, born in 1560 and widely considered one of the first historians of the region, was a follower of the local aristocracy of Languedoc who sought to legitimize their political power through ties to regional history and medieval culture, and thus had de Catel write a history of the Albigensian Crusade.7 Since the publication of these early histories like de Catel’s, the Albigensian Crusade has captured public imagination in a way few other crusades have. This has led to a proliferation of what can only be described as heavily romanticized narratives. The popularization of the romanticized version of the crusade is widely thought to have originated with Napoleon Peyrets' book, Histoire des Aligeois, published in the 1870s.8 Peyret cast pre-crusade Languedoc as an Eden of tolerance and acceptance; citing local communities and nobles' refusal to hand over Cathar heretics to the crusading forces.9 This idea, of the accepting nature of the inhabitants and nobles of Languedoc, had been partially developed by earlier writers of post-revolutionary France who found the plight of the Cathars an effective vehicle to demonstrate the evils of feudal oppression.10 Peyret expanded upon their ideas to generate a romantic and embellished retelling of the crusade. He also introduced the concept of the ‘mystic secrets’ of the Cathars, the most famous of these secrets being the so-called ‘Cathar treasure.’ In Histoire des Aligeois, Peyret outlines his theory of the secret treasure of Montsegur, a castle that was the final Cathar stronghold.11 While this narrative of mystery, secret treasure and religion is attractive, it has little historical value. Modern scholars stress the importance of separating fact from fiction and examining the true motives behind the local Latin Christian communities and nobles in protecting the Cathars.
In examining the success of the Albigensian Crusade, two primary criteria must be met in order for the crusade to be deemed successful: (1), that the crusaders achieved their original goal as defined at the outset of the crusade by the Pope; and (2) the outcome of the crusade was lasting and sustained. These criteria are measurable and there exists sufficient evidence to consider and examine them critically. These criteria, as narrow as they may be, demand critical analysis and examination in order to evaluate the success of the Albigensian Crusade. Examining the goals of individual crusaders, the experiences of local peoples, for example, while interesting, are difficult to consider in a concise and properly informed analysis.
The Albigensian Crusade was launched in July of 1209 by Pope Innocent III against Catharism, a heretical sect of Christianity in the Languedoc region of Southern France. 12 Cathars, as they were commonly referred to, subscribed to a dualist ideology, believing that the material world was evil and refusing to recognize the authority of the church or the Pope who they considered to have been corrupted by the material world.13 The so-called ‘corruption from within’ that all heresy represented was considered one of the gravest dangers facing Christians by religious authorities. It threatened the salvation not only of the heretics, but of all of Christendom.14
Pope Innocent III’s original response to the presence of Cathars in Languedoc was to dispatch Papal Legates to the region. However, local populations and nobles paid virtually no attention to the legates or the demands of the Pope for the nobles to expel Cathars from their communities and take action against them.15 Many of the Cathars were well regarded and productive members of society, and nobles considered them under their protection as members of the community.16 In Languedoc, Cathars lived with other Christians in relative peace, and violence against even non-Christians was rare.17 Toulouse had a large Jewish population, who, while experiencing the discrimination typical of the era, were not the subject to violent assault.18 Thus, there was no precedent in the region for religious violence. Malcolm Barber argues that some of the nobles in the area were not only passive towards the Cathars, but were in fact sympathetic and supportive of the Cathars and their beliefs. Aimery, one of the richest and most well connected lords in the area, was a Cather sympathizer, according to Barber.19 He argues that through the marriages of his sisters, Aimery was able to maintain a ‘heretical network’ of Cathar support throughout the region.20 In the eyes of the Catholic authorities, the reason heresy had been able to spread unchecked was due to the territorial lords like Aimery.21 However, this older claim of a network of organized heresy and supportive nobles has recently come under scrutiny. Mark Gregory Pegg has begun to examine the very nature and accompanying vilification of Catharism. While the nature of Catharism and the network of support it enjoyed was long accepted as fact by the academic community, Mark Gregory Pegg’s work has begun a new discussion surrounding the Cathars. He argues that “Catharism as the scholarly community understood it did not exist”.22 Rather, it was a localized practice and did not represent a massive threat to the Catholic Church and society as was previously believed. As such, there would be no reason for secret networks to exist among the noble population.
Despite the historiographic debates that surround the nature and extent of Catharism, there was nevertheless a crusade launched against the Cathar heresy. The ultimate catalyst for the launch of the crusade was when Peter of Catelnau, one of the Legates sent to the region, excommunicated Raymond VI the Count of Toulouse. Raymond’s men retaliated, and Peter was killed. Raymond was a high ranking noble and his implication in the death of a papal legate gave Pope Innocent III a concrete reason to launch the Albigensian Crusade. He used the murder as one of the primary reasons for calling the crusade in 1208.23 In the Papal bull, Rem Credulam Audivimus, it was explicitly stated that the aim of the crusade was to exact revenge against the Raymond the Count of Toulouse for this murder: “He is presumed to be guilty of the holy man’s death”.24
Did the crusade launched by Pope Innocent III achieve its original goal set out at the time -- exacting revenge for the murder of a papal legate? While identifying the goal of the crusade on paper is relatively straightforward, examining and determining if this was, in fact, the true aim of the crusade can be far more difficult. In modern scholarship, it is generally assumed that Pope Innocent III used the alleged murder of one of his Legates as an excuse to take more drastic action against a heretical sect and a group of nobles who he believed were directly subverting his power and authority. This narrative is corroborated by the fact that Raymond surrendered to the crusaders in 1209 and then joined with them after his surrender.25 However, having met the goal of exacting revenge on the Count of Toulouse by forcing his surrender to Papal authority, the crusaders nevertheless did not stop, but began a campaign of violence against the Cathars in the region that lasted until 1229.26
In examining the true motives behind the Albigensian Crusade, another important aspect must be considered - the support of the French Crown. The French Crown and the Papacy both had a significant interest in the redistribution of power in the Languedoc region, which was made possible as local nobles fell to the crusaders. Historically, the ruling Capetian monarchy never had a strong grip in Languedoc. The majority of the power lay with the local nobles and in the systems they had established for governing their various territories, which was often to the detriment of the central authority of the French Crown. 27 By replacing Languedoc nobles with those loyal to the French Crown, the Crown had the potential to firmly establish itself in the region. For its part, the Papacy also had a vested interest in redistributing the power of the local nobility into the hands of those nobles who were loyal to the French Crown, as the Papacy and the French Monarchy enjoyed a close and mutually beneficial relationship.28 While the aim of the crusade was clear on paper - exacting revenge on the Count of Toulouse - the true motivations of the Papacy and the French Crown were influenced by pre-existing power structures and a bid for greater influence.
The French Crown and the Papacy wished to suppress and eliminate such a visible challenge to their authority, represented by both the heresy and the non-compliant locals of the region, and in this they were successful. The political landscape of Languedoc was forever changed by the Albigensian Crusade as nobles and towns fell to the crusaders. Simon de Montfort, who had risen to become the leader of the Albigensian Crusade, was allowed to keep many of his conquests made on crusade. Tellingly, by the end of the crusade, Simon de Montfort had become the Count of Toulouse, Viscount of Breziers, and Carsonne and Duke of Narbonne.29 He was killed, however, when Raymond VI, the former Count of Toulouse, occupied the city in an ultimately futile bid to re-establish himself. Eventually, the conquered lands passed to Simon de Montfort’s son, who then ceded the lands to the French Crown.30 The ultimate result was a significant increase in the French Crown’s presence in the Languedoc region, and a firmly established central authority in Southern France.
The French Crown’s authority in the region was further extended by the Treaty of Paris of 1229, which marked the official end of the Albigensian Crusade. The treaty is often cited as the agreement that allowed the Inquisition to begin its reign of terror in the Languedoc region, with the aim of rooting out heresy once and for all. The treaty allowed for houses to be searched and, if any heretic was found, they would be arrested and tortured.31 Other measures designed to reduce the probability of resurgent heresy were put in place, including the continued surveillance of suspected heretics, along with new rules concerning the professions and crafting of wills of suspected persons.32 The French Crown and the Papacy did not hesitate to flex their new found powers to implement the Inquisition in Southern France. If the true goal of the Albigensian Crusade was rooting out insubordination and local opposition to the French Crown and the Pope, the crusade was successful in achieving this end.
But what of the destruction of the Cathars? Unlike crusades to Outremer, the destruction of the Cathars was not a physical or material objective, such as the capture of a city. Wiping out a heretical sect is a far more difficult task, and it is not clear if the crusaders were successful in ultimately destroying the Cathars. The movements of the crusaders in the Languedoc region are well known, but it is much harder to tell if the Cathars were wiped out partially, completely, or just sent underground. What is clear, however, is that the Albigensian Crusade allowed the Inquisition to be unleashed on the Languedoc region, and the Cathars never represented a significant threat to Church authority ever again.
The second criterion for success is whether the outcome of the Albigensian Crusade was lasting and sustained. This criterion is easier to measure because no matter what the true aim of the crusade may have been, the question to be addressed is whether the consequences and outcome resulted in lasting change. In the case of the Albigensian Crusade, this paper asserts that the result was indeed lasting and sustained. While the destruction of the Cathars is still debated in both scholarship and in the public arena, the crusade did result in a shift in power and influence in the Languedoc region, as discussed above. Interestingly, the crusade is also credited with the establishment of the Dominican order, an order of preachers approved by Pope Innocent III in 1216. Founded to preach against heresy, Saint Dominic’s dealing with Cathars greatly influenced his life and outlook. While Saint Dominic was not particularly successful in converting Cathars, he was able to convert a minority.33 Moreover, he eventually established a convent for converted Cathar women, which became the foundation of the Dominican nuns. In time, the Dominican Order would rise to be at the forefront of academic life in the medieval period, and still exists today.34 Clearly, the Albigensian Crusade’s legacy and the influence of the French Crown in the Languedoc Region persists to this day. While romanticized narratives like Napoleon Peyrets' may argue that the Cathars were able to persist in secret, passing down mysteries and hints concerning a hidden treasure, there is no scholarly evidence to support these claims.
The Albigensian Crusade is only one of many crusades against heretics that took place in the medieval period. The wide array of historiography surrounding the Albigensian Crusade is representative of the diversity of interpretations and thought with respect to various crusades against heretics. The Albigensian Crusade is unique, with its own genesis and outcomes. It would be a mistake to analyse all crusades launched against heretics as one and the same. However, the aim of this case study was to set criteria to determine if the Albigensian Crusade was a success. While both have nuanced answers, as demonstrated in this analysis, the crusaders did achieve the original goal of the crusade as outlined by the Pope, and the results were lasting. Therefore, by these criteria, the crusade was a success.
However, this analysis also demonstrates the difficulty in evaluating the success of crusades against heretics and the need to choose the right criteria by which to measure this success. While this paper argues that the Albigensian Crusade was ultimately successful, this finding should not be universally applied to all crusades against heretics. However, this analysis of the Albigensian Crusade nevertheless does add value to the scholarship surrounding crusades against heretics, and the criteria outlined in this article could be used to evaluate the success of crusades against heretics elsewhere in order to better understand the outcome and consequences of the event.
Bibliography
Barber, Malcolm, The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle Ages ( London: Routeledge, 2013)
Giles Constable, “The Historiography of the Crusades,” in The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou & Roy Pariz Mottahdeh (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2001), 1-22.
Michael Costen, The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997)
Graham-Leigh, The Southern French Nobility and the Albigensian Crusade (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1988)
Mark Gregory Pegg, A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009
Marvin, Laurence W, The Albigensian Crusade in Anglo-American Historiography, 1888-2013, History Compass 11, no.12 (2013): 1126- 1138. https://doi- org.libaccess.lib.mcmaster.ca/10.1111/hic3.12122.
Power, Daniel, ‘Who went on the Albigensian Crusade?’, The English Historical Review 128, (October 2013): 1047-1085. https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cet252.
Rummel, Eric O, ‘The Albigensian Crusade: A Historiographical Essay’, Perspectives in
History 21, (2005-6): 47-57. https://www.nku.edu/content/dam/hisgeo/docs/archives/Vol21_2005- 2006perspectives.pdf.
1 Giles Constable, “The Historiography of the Crusades,” in The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou & Roy Pariz Mottahdeh (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2001), 7.
2 Ibid.
3 Barber, Malcolm, The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle Ages ( London: Routeledge, 2013), 42.
4 Elaine Graham-Leigh, The Southern French Nobility and the Albigensian Crusade (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1988), 10.
5 Daniel Power, “ Who Went on the Albigensian Crusade?,” The English Historical Review 128, (October 2013): 1052, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cet252.
6 Graham-Leigh, The Southern French Nobility, 7.
7 Graham-Leigh, The Southern French Nobility, 5.
8 Ibid.
9 Graham-Leigh, The Southern French Nobility, 3.
10 Graham-Leigh, The Southern French Nobility, 16.
11 Mark Gregory Pegg, A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the Battle for Christendom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 11.
12 Eric O. Rummel, “The Albigensian Crusade: A Historiographical Essay,” Perspectives in History, 21(2005-6): 46.
13 Barber, The Cathars, 8.
14 Pegg, A Most Holy War, 7.
15 Graham-Leigh, The Southern French Nobility, 90.
16 Barber, The Cathars, 74.
17 Rummel, A Historiographical Essay, 49.
18 Michael Costen, The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 38.
19 Barber, The Cathars, 43.
20 Ibid.
21 Barber, The Cathars, 45.
22 Rummel, A Historiographical Essay, 49.
23 Laurence W. Marvin, ‘The Albigensian Crusade in Anglo-American Historiography, 1888-2013’, History Compass 11/12, (2013), 1134, https://doiorg.libaccess.lib.mcmaster.ca/10.1111/hic3.12122
24 Graham-Leigh, The Southern French Nobility, 14.
25 Costen, The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade, 38.
26 Pegg, A Most Holy War, 210
27 Costen, The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade, 26.
28 Ibid.
29 Barber, The Cathars, 52.
30 Ibid.
31 Pegg, A Most Holy War, 180
32 Barber, The Cathars, 168.
33 Pegg, A Most Holy War, 215.
34 Ibid.
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